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By Phillip Areedat and Donald F. Turnerl
A further point-by-point reply to Professor Williamson would un-
duly tax the readers of the Journal. The principal differences between
us are adequately set forth in the several articles,1 and we leave the
dispute where it sits. It does seem worthwhile, however, to comment
on two points.
The first concerns Williamson's general characterization of our ap-
proach. Although we appreciate his kind words about our original
contribution, we do not understand the repeated criticisms that we
ignore a would-be predator's strategic motivations and that we rest
solely on static economic analysis. Such characterizations do not fairly
express our views about the formulation of wise and administrable
legal rules.
Our original article2 expressly addressed pricing arising out of a
monopolist's desire to exclude entry. We discussed at considerable
length the problem of pricing that excludes potentially efficient rivals
without giving the public the benefits of long-run competitive pricing.
The long-run welfare implications of such pricing concerned us in the
original article and still do. The question we posed there and continue
to ask is whether such considerations can be incorporated into sensible
legal rules that would do more good than harm.
Williamson agrees that forcing a monopolist to maintain preexisting
prices would be undesirable. His proposal 3 to limit expansion of the
monopolist's output is an intriguing and more plausible approach. But
it suffers from the difficulties analyzed in our last article,4 which also
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pointed out that Williamson himself is often forced to rely on cost-based
rules in defining predatory pricing. In saying this, we do not pretend-
nor have our previous writings suggested-that a marginal-cost test
(using a surrogate of average variable cost where appropriate) is free
from administrative difficulties or other imperfections. Simply put, our
position is this: giving due recognition to those problems and to the
various long-run and "strategic" considerations urged by Williamson
and others, theoretical uncertainties and administrative considerations
suggest that the marginal-cost test is nonetheless the most sensible
solution. Such a conclusion, of course, does not rest on eternal verities.
We would be happy to endorse a better solution should one appear.
Second, Williamson makes much of the fact that neither in our
original article nor in our response to his first article do we address
the issue of "fairness," which in his view "is among the values that
antitrust law is designed to foster."' We have not dwelt on "fairness"
because it is far too unruly a concept to serve any useful purpose in
formulating appropriate antitrust rules. Depending on how it is con-
ceived, it may or may not be consistent with competition. Fairness is
indeed a value served by antitrust, but only in the sense that fairness
is a by-product of a pro-competitive, efficiency-oriented policy. For
example, competition promotes "fairness" by ensuring that prices are
equal to costs. Fairness in this sense may support conclusions reached
on competitive, efficiency, and administrative grounds, and invoking
it for that purpose may do no harm. But beyond that, it can only
mislead, as in the myriad ways in which plaintiffs seek to invoke "fair-
ness" to protect themselves, not competition or consumers. If William-
son is right on economic and administrative grounds, his invocation of
"fairness" is superfluous. If he is wrong, his appeal to "fairness" can
only deflect antitrust law from an appropriate test for predatory
pricing.
5. Williamson, Williamson on Predatory Pricing 1I, 88 YA Lx L.J. 1183, 1197 (1979).
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